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Red Scare or Red Herring:  
How the “China Initiative” Strategy for Non-Tradi-
tional Collectors is Stifling Innovation in the United 
States 
Bianca T. Tillman * 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Changing Face of Global Innovation 
The United States (U.S.) is a consistent leader in global innovation 
and scientific discourse.1 Since 2007, the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO) has ranked the U.S. amongst the world’s top ten most 
innovative countries, based on both subjective and objective innovative 
capacity data.2 In its annual Global Innovation Index (GII),3 the WIPO 
aims to recognize the human aspects behind innovations4 that are essential 
 
* Bianca Tillman is originally from Vancouver, Canada and graduates from Seattle University 
School of Law in May 2021. Ms. Tillman would like to thank her family, friends, faculty advisors, 
and fellow SJTEIL members for their support. A special thanks to Tyler for his love, patience, and 
encouragement. 
1 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., THE GLOB. INNOVATION INDEX 2020 xxxii (Sumitra Dutta, Bruno 
Lanvin, & Sacha Wunnsch-Vincent eds., 13th ed. 2020), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pub-
docs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YF5-5ZLF] [hereinafter “GII 2020”]; see gener-
ally About the Global Innovation Index, GLOB. INNOVATION INDEX, https://www.globalinnovation-
index.org/about-gii [https://perma.cc/66YQ-NDTW] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020, 2:39 PM) [hereinaf-
ter “About GII”]. 
2 Id.  
3 The GII is computed by taking a simple average of the scores in two sub-indices, the Innovation 
Input Index and Innovation Output Index, which are composed of five and two pillars respectively. 
Each of these pillars describe an attribute of innovation, and comprise up to five indicators, and their 
score is calculated by the weighted average method. Five input pillars capture elements of the na-
tional economy that enable innovative activities: (1) Institutions, (2) Human capital and research, (3) 
Infrastructure, (4) Market sophistication, and (5) Business sophistication. Two output pillars capture 
actual evidence of innovation outputs: (6) Knowledge and technology outputs and (7) Creative out-
puts. Id. 
4 Such as work organization practices (ex. monitoring the quality of products or services, monitoring 
external/global ideas, the structure of the work organization, collaboration and the degree of team 
autonomy or task autonomy), human resource management (ex. recruiting diverse and skilled em-
ployees, financial, educational, and professional development incentives for exemplary work), and 
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for designing policies aimed at promoting economic development and 
richer innovation-prone environments.5 The U.S. not only excels on the 
non-technological side of innovation, but also models exemplary scores in 
traditional innovation markers, such as research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, market sophistication, infrastructure, and creative outputs.6 
The WIPO vigorously emphasizes the importance of international 
openness and robust knowledge flow for the “development of successful 
innovation nations and international innovation networks.”7 Economies 
are more innovative when they incorporate a diverse set of scholarly 
voices with the ability to speak on an expansive range of social and scien-
tific issues.8 Furthermore, global value chains, bilateral technology agree-
ments,9 and increased international cooperation are essential building 
blocks of today’s global innovation networks. By expanding these net-
works to connect scientists and innovators across the world, countries and 
citizens have gained access to important scientific exchanges for the ben-
efit of humankind.10 In March 2020, for example, a virology lab at the 
University of Pittsburg collaborated with the Pasteur Institute in Paris and 
the Austrian drug company Themis Bioscience on potential advances to-
ward animal vaccine testing for COVID-19.11 With experts scattered all 
 
employee/researcher participation (ex. employee involvement in decision-making and management 
consultation with employees). Also known as the “non-technological” side of innovation. Stavroula 
Demetriades & Franz Ferdinand Eiffe, Innovative Changes in European Companies, EUROFOUND 
20, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2017/innovative-changes-in-european-
companies#tab-01 [https://perma.cc/Z2S6-JH4V] (last updated June 26, 2017). 
5 See generally About GII, supra note 1. 
6 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., THE GLOB. INNOVATION INDEX 2019 341(Sumitra Dutta, Bruno 
Lanvin, & Sacha Wunnsch-Vincent eds., 12th ed. 2019), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pub-
docs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3AA-MXZQ] [hereinafter “GII 2019”]. 
7 Id. at 9. 
8 Richard B. Freeman, One Ring to Rule Them All? Globalization of Knowledge and Knowledge 
Creation, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH. 18 (2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19301.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QE3Y-DPB3]. 
9 Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Highlights: 32 Years of Collabora-
tion, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/microsites/ostp/st-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5GV-58Z3] (last visited Oct 31, 2020, 
3:00 PM) [hereinafter “S&T Fact Sheet”]. 
10 Researchers from around the world have been using free online web servers to distribute their 
complete but unpublished manuscripts (known as preprints) in various fields of research like science, 
mathematics, and economics, since as early as 1991. See e.g About arXiv, ARXIV 
https://arxiv.org/about [https://perma.cc/K4BC-SU3K] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020, 4:25 PM); Instead 
of facing lengthy delays in the peer-review process, the open source distribution model allows au-
thors to receive immediate feedback from the academic community, with the average paper receiv-
ing hundreds of downloads, comments, tweets, and notes in its first few months. Richard J. Abdill & 
Ran Blekhman, Tracking the Popularity and Outcomes of All bioRxiv Preprints, BIORXIV 26-27 
(2019), https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/515643v2.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YL2-NZJ5] 
(last updated Apr. 2, 2019). 
11 Researchers in Pittsburgh, Paris and Vienna Win Grant for COVID-19 Vaccine (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.upmc.com/media/news/032020-cepi-grant [https://perma.cc/R76V-3VGW]. 
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around the world, the globalization of knowledge creation is the inevitable 
next step as we look to solve ever more complex problems with increas-
ingly innovative and sophisticated solutions. 
In the GII 2019 report, the WIPO voiced concern about increasing 
protectionism;12 particularly, “protectionism that impacts technology-in-
tensive sectors and knowledge flows [posing] risks to global innovation 
networks and innovation diffusion.”13 While some experts tout the Trump 
Administration’s “America First” policy as the greatest protectionist threat 
to global trade,14 other political strategies, such as the EU Common Agri-
cultural Policy, Brexit, and Made in China 2025, also evoke WIPO appre-
hension, as each causes global protectionism to rise. If left uncontained, 
these new obstacles to international trade, investment, and workforce mo-
bility could lead to a slowdown of growth in innovation productivity in the 
U.S. and globally.15 As more countries develop, gain access to the global 
scientific conversation, and welcome international discourse, some ex-
perts warn that the Trump Administration’s protectionist policies will 
cause students and scholars to take their talent and academic ambitions 
elsewhere.16 When we turn fledgling innovators away from the U.S., ex-
perts explain that we lose much more than the individuals themselves. 
Eventually,  
we lose their inventions and innovation, their collaborative input and 
their contributions to our communities. In time, we will lose our cen-
ters of technical excellence, which will, inevitably, migrate to places 
where every talented contributor is welcome. Ultimately, we will lose 
not just our status as a global leader, but the very identity that earned 
it.17 
 
12 Protectionism refers to government policies that restrict international trade to help domestic indus-
tries. Protectionist policies are usually implemented with the goal to improve economic activity 
within a domestic economy but can also be implemented for safety or quality concerns. Examples of 
protectionist policies include tariffs, quotas, standardization, and government subsidies. Protection-
ism itself is not inherently problematic, however too much protectionism may result in stagnation of 
technological advancements. Protectionism: The Practice of Following Protectionist Trade Policies, 
CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/ resources/knowledge/economics/protection-
ism/ [https://perma.cc/4RHR-HGX4].  
13 GII 2019, supra note 6, at xvii. 




16 In fact, new international student enrollment has been on a steady decline since 2016. Losing Tal-
ent 2020: An Economic and Foreign Policy Risk America Can’t Ignore, NAFSA 5 (Mar. 2020), 
https://www.nafsa.org/sites/ default/files/media/document/nafsa-losing-talent.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZHW5-8JHK] [hereinafter “NAFSA Losing Talent Report”].  
17 Id. at 1. 
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In recent years, the U.S. has exhibited especially protectionist be-
havior in its relationship with China, a country that the U.S has been for-
mally collaborating with for more than 40 years.18 Despite China’s docu-
mented instances of economic aggression towards the U.S. and the 
world,19 the U.S. was careful to preserve its valuable scientific and re-
search partnerships with the emerging state up until 2018. Some scholars 
argue that the U.S.’ status as a leading global innovator could not have 
been maintained without the help of its Chinese counterparts.20 A recent 
study on the nature of co-publications between the U.S. and China showed 
that recent growth in U.S. science and engineering research was dependent 
on collaboration with Chinese scholars, whereas China’s total growth in 
science and engineering research output would have increased over the 
same period regardless of contribution from the U.S.21 Consequently, the 
U.S. has more to lose than gain if it chooses to cut ties with China, espe-
cially when considered “[f]rom [the] U.S. nation-state perspective, that 
views scientific advancement as zero-sum competition with winners and 
losers.”22 Even so, the U.S. recently moved forward with a robust protec-
tionist policy, the China Initiative, to aggressively counter China’s “threat 
to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security.”23 
B. More than a Friendly Rivalry 
As part of its national security strategy, the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) implemented the “China Initiative” on November 1, 2018, 
a “whole-of-government approach” to maintaining the country's military, 
technological, and economic edge over China.24 Launched against a back-
drop of concern over China’s aggressive economic practices, the China 
 
18 See U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, UNITED STATES – CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
COOPERATION, BIENNIAL REP. TO U.S. CONG. (July 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/197119.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDU6-A8ZA] [hereinafter “SECRETARY OF STATE 
S&T COOPERATION REPORT 2012”]; S&T Fact Sheet, supra note 9. 
19 See generally White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic 
Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World 
(Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-
Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBC8-D74K] [hereinafter “White House 
China Report”]. 
20 Jenny J. Lee & John P. Haupt, Winners and Losers in US-China Scientific Research Collabora-
tions, 80 HIGHER EDUC. 57 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-019-00464-
7 [https://perma.cc/25E4-STLX]. 
21 Id. at 9. 
22 Id. at 14. 
23 Department of Justice, ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSION’S CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET 
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/download [https://perma.cc/TLP5-N28S] 
[hereinafter “Fact Sheet”]. 
24 Id. 
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Initiative aims to restrict Chinese access to U.S. technology and intellec-
tual property through protectionist legal and policy procedures.25 U.S. and 
Chinese intelligence agencies have spied on each other for decades,26 but 
in recent years, “China has increased both the scope and the sophistication 
of its efforts to steal secrets from the U.S.”27 While the DOJ’s goal to in-
crease safeguards of U.S. military, intelligence, and private sector assets 
may be justified, the department’s decision to include non-traditional col-
lectors, like researchers in labs and universities, is worryingly overbroad 
and distracting.28 
American universities and research institutions have always been 
leaders in fostering open and collaborative spaces where academics and 
researchers from all over the world come together to solve some of the 
world’s greatest challenges. The scientific community asserts that such in-
ternational collaboration is crucial for the advancement of scientific inno-
vation and breakthroughs. The DOJ’s China Initiative threatens to stifle 
these collaborations by intimidating, discouraging, and driving out inter-
national researchers, especially those of Chinese origin. 
The China Initiative broadens the DOJ’s discretion to investigate 
universities and research institutions for instances of academic espio-
nage—that is, stealing American data, information, and ideas from re-
search settings for the benefit of a foreign government.29 Prior to the initi-
ative, academic espionage convictions were challenging to prove because 
they required actual intent to share sensitive information and direct evi-
dence of intellectual property theft.30 The China Initiative lessens the evi-
dentiary burden on the DOJ by allowing academic espionage to be implied 
 
25 Id. 
26 See generally, Alexander Holt, A brief history of US-China espionage entanglements, MIT 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sep. 3, 2020), https://www.technolo-
gyreview.com/2020/09/03/1007609/trade-secrets-china-us-espionage-timeline/ 
[https://perma.cc/C2PP-HRMK]. 
27 In 2019, for example, three former U.S. intelligence officers pled guilty to espionage-related 
charges involving China, a former General Electric engineer was charged with theft of trade secrets 
related to gas and steam turbines, and two Chinese hackers were charged with leading a hacking 
group targeting U.S. intellectual property and confidential business information. Mike Giglio, 
China’s Spies Are on the Offensive, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/595747/ [https://perma.cc/L3N7-
3N43]. 
28 Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 
29 Erin N. Grubbs, Note, Academic Espionage: Striking the Balance Between Open and Collabora-
tive Universities and Protecting National Security, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 235, 239 (2019). 
30 Id. at 257-259. 
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through a collection of previously dormant or underutilized federal report-
ing statutes.31 The FBI alleges that a researcher’s failure to accurately re-
port ties to China-based employment, grants, or other funding sources im-
plies that the researcher must be engaging in academic espionage on behalf 
of China.32 Since launching the initiative in 2018, the DOJ has charged 
various scientists, researchers, and institutions with crimes of wire fraud 
for failing to accurately report their financial or academic ties to China.33 
This new enforcement strategy has caused upheaval at universities and re-
search institutions as they scramble to comply with these previously ig-
nored reporting rules or abruptly dismiss “suspicious” researchers for fear 
of losing crucial federal funding.34  
Scholars of Chinese descent have historically struggled for equal-
ity in the American academic system,35 but since the turn of the century, 
they have experienced an alarming uptick in wrongful accusations of sus-
picious activity, such as economic espionage.36 The China Initiative has 
ramped up this inequity. While threats to national security must be taken 
seriously, the U.S. should change the DOJ’s ambiguous and overly broad 
China Initiative enforcement strategy to preserve its reputation as a leading 
global innovator. 
The DOJ’s China Initiative should be analyzed and reformed with 
respect to academia for three very important reasons. First, the initiative 
was created to preserve the U.S.’ position as a world leader in science and 
innovation; however, by alienating scientists of Chinese descent, the initi-
ative puts the U.S. at risk of falling behind other nations who choose to 
nurture and protect open lines of international scientific discourse. Trump 
 
31See e.g. HEA section 117, 20 U.S.C. § 1011f (1965); Notice of Investigation and Record Requests, 
84 Fed. Reg. 34,878 (July 18, 2019). 
32 David Bowdich, Deputy Director, FBI, Remarks at Texas A&M University Academic Security 
and Counter Exploitation Annual Seminar: The Importance of Partnerships in Responding to the 
Chinese Economic Espionage Threat to Academia (Mar 4, 2020), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-importance-of-partnerships-in-responding-to-the-chinese-
economic-espionage-threat-to-academia [https://perma.cc/N4XL-MJTB]. 
33 High profile arrests include the chair of Harvard University’s chemistry department, Charles 
Lieber, and in “December 2019, the DOJ reached a USD 5.5 million settlement with Van Andel Re-
search Institute to resolve allegations that the institute failed to disclose its receipt of Chinese gov-
ernment grants that funded the work of two of its researchers.” Jack P. DiCanio et al., DOJ’s ‘China 
Initiative’ Uses Scheme-to-Defraud Charges for Nondisclosure of Ties to China, SKADDEN (APR. 
2, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/04/dojs-china-initiative 
[https://perma.cc/X5XH-S5MP]. 
34 Id. 
35 For a high-level outline of anti-Asian racism in the U.S., see e.g. Adrian De Leon, The Long His-
tory of Racism Against Asian Americans in the U.S., PBS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/news-
hour/nation/the-long-history-of-racism-against-asian-americans-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/Z45J-
SHC6]. 
36 Andrew Chongseh Kim, Prosecuting Chinese “Spies”: An Empirical Analysis of the Economic 
Espionage Act, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 752 (2018). 
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Administration policies, such as “America First,” have made the U.S. a 
less attractive destination for aspiring innovators, and the China Initiative 
threatens to exacerbate those chilling effects. Second, as a world leader in 
scientific research and innovation, the U.S. is often seen as a hub for in-
ternational knowledge exchange; thus, increased protectionism poses a 
great risk to global innovation networks and innovation diffusion. If left 
unreformed, these new obstacles to international trade, investment, and 
academic mobility will diminish growth in innovation productivity and 
diffusion in both the U.S. and across the globe. Lastly, racially oppressive 
policies and practices have historically left lasting negative impacts on 
American society.37 The China Initiative has potential to permanently 
damage the Asian-American community, further proliferating ethnic and 
cultural divides in the U.S.  
This article examines whether the China Initiative obstructs the 
U.S.’ goal of maintaining its status as a leader in global innovation and 
scientific discourse. It contends that although the DOJ’s sweeping ap-
proach to “non-traditional collectors” is meant to protect the U.S.’ innova-
tive advantage, it stifles innovation by exacerbating existing issues of ra-
cial animus and increasing uncertainty for U.S.-based researchers and in-
stitutions. Part II documents the evolution of China from an integral part-
ner to a perceived threat to the U.S. in recent decades. Part III defines the 
China Initiative and explains why the DOJ’s current wholesale enforce-
ment approach is problematic rather than protective. Part IV analyzes the 
negative effects of the China Initiative on academia through the eyes of 
institutions, students, administrators, and scholars. These negative effects 
vary in size and scale, ranging from subtle declines in international student 
enrollment, to administrative backlogs, forced removals, and criminal in-
dictments of scientists and researchers with Chinese ties. Part V recognizes 
the importance of the DOJ’s robust China focus but presents alternative 
ideas for creating a more nuanced enforcement approach, such as improv-
ing the DOJ’s understanding of scientific research, expanding diversity 
within the DOJ, and creating programs to address implicit bias and racial 
profiling inside the DOJ. 
 
37 See e.g. Kelly Tian, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and Its Impact on North American Society, 
9 UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES (2010) 
https://www.kon.org/urc/v9/tian.html [https://perma.cc/927K-XHS7] (describing how the Chinese 
Exclusion Act harmed relations between the Chinese community and Americans). 
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II. THE RISE OF CHINA 
A. A Brief History of China 
Mao Zedong was the founding father of the People’s Republic of 
China. Amidst the uncertainty following Mao’s death in 1976, Chinese 
leaders struggled to find a way to move their country forward.38 Under 
Mao, living standards for both rural and urban Chinese deteriorated sig-
nificantly, resulting in tremendous rates of absolute poverty.39 Decades of 
centralized planning and state control of the economy brought much of the 
country to its knees, leaving Chinese officials inevitably grasping for a 
solution to the country’s social and economic problems.40 At the beginning 
of the 1980s, Chinese officials cautiously decided to introduce capitalism 
while still maintaining the country’s meticulous authoritarian social struc-
ture.41 What followed was over 40 years of explosive economic growth, 
taking China from the ranks of a developing nation and emerging market, 
to upper-middle income nation and established market, in just a few short 
decades.42 
This booming economic growth was aided by China’s adoption of 
capitalism coinciding with the world’s shift towards globalization, which 
perfectly positioned China as an underregulated, inexpensive, and attrac-
tive place to build the “world’s factory.”43 Confidence in globalization em-
powered massive amounts of Western capital and intellectual property to 
flow into the emerging Chinese market, but few Western investors recog-
nized the geopolitical significance of this shift at the time.44 Instead, they 
 
38 Megan Specia, Five Takeaways from Our New China Project, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/world/asia/china-rules-takeaways.html 
[https://perma.cc/X4UH-Q5T5]. 
39 Kent Deng, Great Leaps Backward: Poverty Under Mao, LSE RSCH. ONLINE 36-37 (2000), 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/652/ [https://perma.cc/Z8KL-JWSS]. “Absolute poverty” is defined by the 
UN as “a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe 
drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only 
on income but also on access to social services.” United Nations Department of Economic and So-
cial Affairs, World Summit for Social Development 1995: WSSD 1995 Agreements: PAWSSD Chap-
ter 2 (Copenhagen: United Nations, 1995), available from https://www.un.org/develop-
ment/desa/dspd/world-summit-for-social-development-1995/wssd-1995-agreements/pawssd-chapter-
2.html [https://perma.cc/VB9X-7D3K]. 
40 Specia, supra note 38. 
41 Id.  
42 GII 2019, supra note 6 at xx. 
43 Prableen Bajpai, Why China is "The World's Factory,” INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/articles/investing/102214/why-china-worlds-factory.asp [https://perma.cc/D583-
24W5] (last updated Feb. 13, 2020). 
44 Mile Simpson, Globalization Has Created a Chinese Monster, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 26, 2018, 
3:13 PM) https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/26/globalization-has-created-a-chinese-monster/ 
[https://perma.cc/J6S5-PABQ].  
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praised the economic growth story, and not without good reason: the inte-
gration of China into global markets lifted nearly a billion people out of 
poverty.45 China’s rapid economic growth remains a testament to the ma-
terial benefits of removing geopolitical obstructions from the development 
of global business. 
B. The United States Opens Up to China  
The U.S. and China officially began collaborating in the realm of 
science and innovation in 1979, when the countries bilaterally embraced 
the U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (S&T 
Agreement).46 With periodic renewals spanning the last forty plus years, 
the S&T Agreement launched  
an era of robust government-to-government science and technology 
collaboration[,] …[with] exchanges fostered under the Agreement 
[that] advanced cooperative research in a diverse array of fields, in-
cluding fisheries, earth and atmospheric sciences, basic research in 
physics and chemistry, a variety of energy-related areas, agriculture, 
civil industrial technology, geology, health, and disaster research.47  
Under the S&T Agreement, the U.S. received significant benefit from its 
collaborations with Chinese subject matter experts in various areas.  
In the realm of agriculture, for example, cooperation between the 
U.S. Agricultural Research Service and the Chinese Ministry of Science 
and Technology “enhanced U.S. preparedness to control invasive agricul-
tural pest species[,] helped U.S. scientists develop new seed varieties[,] 
and [kept domestic] food prices competitive by gaining access to genetic 
resources in Chinese collections.”48 The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) further collaborated with Chinese partners to “reduce pol-
lution loads and their impacts on the United States…[while also] im-
prov[ing] Chinese environmental laws, regulations and enforcement.”49 
Additionally, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) collaborated with 
China in global immunization, epidemiologic training, and biomedical re-
 
45 Id.; Javier C. Hernández & Quoctrung Bui, The American Dream Is Alive. In China, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/18/world/asia/china-social-mobil-
ity.html [https://perma.cc/NHV7-AWU9]. 
46 See generally, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, UNITED STATES – CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
COOPERATION, BIENNIAL REP. TO U.S. – CHINA ECON. & SEC COMM’N (Dec. 2006), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96437.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5ZB-TJ5Q]. 
47 S&T Fact Sheet, supra note 9. 
48 SECRETARY OF STATE S&T COOPERATION REPORT 2012, supra note 18, at 2. 
49 Id. at 6. 
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search resulting in an enhanced “ability to recognize and respond to do-
mestic and global disease outbreaks and by providing opportunities to ad-
vance treatment and prevention of diseases that affect Americans.”50 
C. Made in China 2025 
At first, China was slow at implementing comprehensive, long-
term industrial strategies to safeguard its eventual rise as a global eco-
nomic superpower.51 In 2015, however, the Chinese government released 
its new state-led industrial policy called Made in China 2025, which, ac-
cording to U.S. experts, “aims to use government subsidies, mobilize state-
owned enterprises, and pursue intellectual property acquisition to catch up 
with—and then surpass—Western technological prowess in advanced in-
dustries.”52 Chinese state officials describe the plan as part of a “‘three 
step’ strategy of transforming China into a leading manufacturing power 
by the year 2049, which marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China.”53 By 2019, China became the first mid-
dle-income nation to break into the top 15 of WIPO’s Global Innovation 
Index,54 indicating that the country’s new policy is likely working.  
According to U.S. officials, China’s recent growth has been 
achieved “through aggressive acts, policies, and practices that fall outside 
of global norms and rules.”55 In some respects, China has been transparent 
about these aggressive acts, policies, and practices. A 2018 White House 
report found hostile economic commands in Chinese government docu-
ments, in Chinese state actor’s behaviors, and in reports produced by var-
ious business organizations, think tanks, and government agencies.56 Even 
so, the DOJ reports that nearly “80 percent of all economic espionage pros-
ecutions … allege conduct that would benefit the Chinese state, and 
 
50 Id. at 5. 
51 Press Release, White House, Office of Trade & Manufacturing, Policy Report: “How China’s Eco-
nomic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the 
World” (June 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/office-trade-manufactur-
ing-policy-report-chinas-economic-aggression-threatens-technologies-intellectual-property-united-
states-world/ [https://perma.cc/ETS8-DUNK]. 
52 James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade?, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade 
[https://perma.cc/YAY7-2DSP] (last updated May 13, 2019); About CFR, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL., https://www.cfr.org/about [https://perma.cc/EFC6-EKKF] (last visited Oct 31, 2020, 4:48 
PM).  
53 ‘Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued, STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA, http://eng-
lish.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/05/19/content_281475110703534.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EQP5-68BQ] (last updated May 19, 2015).  
54 GII 2019, supra note 6, at 12. China maintained its rank of 14th in the 2020 GII. See GII 2020, su-
pra note 1, at xxxii. 
55 See Press Release, White House, supra note 51.  
56 Id. 
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around 60 percent of all trade secret theft cases … involve some nexus to 
China.”57 A 2017 report projected that Chinese theft of U.S. intellectual 
property could be costing anywhere from $225 to $600 billion on an an-
nual basis.58 Given the size of China’s economy and the extent of its mar-
ket-distorting ways, the White House warns that China’s newest wave of 
economic aggression threatens to undermine U.S. economic and national 
security.59  
 “Made in China 2025” is not the first illustration of aggressive 
Chinese economic policy appearing to compromise U.S. intellectual prop-
erty rights, violate U.S. privacy norms, or threaten U.S. dominance as the 
world’s economic leader.60 In an analysis of charges brought under the 
Economic Espionage Act61 (EEA) from 2009-2015, one study found that 
62% of defendants charged under the EEA were of Asian Heritage.62 Ex-
perts, who support the DOJ, contend that such a high rate of race-specific 
prosecutions can only be explained by the fact that Chinese-Americans 
and Chinese nationals are the main perpetrators of economic crimes for 
the benefit of their home country.63 Made in China 2025 further reinforces 
that narrative by “encourag[ing] state subsidies for domestic companies 
and forc[ing] technology transfer from foreign companies with the aim of 
driving them out of business.”64 
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Trade Act of 1974, and 
other legislation grant the president the power to levy tariffs and other 
 
57 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Information About the Department of Justice’s China Initiative 
and a Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/infor-
mation-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related 
[https://perma.cc/5237-A8KL] (last updated Oct. 20, 2020). 
58 The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, INTELL. PROP. 
COMM’N 12 (2017), http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WXA5-MPBY]. 
59 White House China Report, supra note 19, at 2. 
60 Breaking the Mould: Trump’s China Policy, INST. FOR SEC. & DEV. POL’Y (Feb. 2018), 
https://isdp.eu/publication/breaking-mould-trumps-china-policy/ [https://perma.cc/3K4W-3ZA9]. 
61 The Economic Espionage Act is one of many statutes used by federal prosecutors to convict de-
fendants suspected of espionage. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006)). 
62 Defendants charged under the EEA are alleged to have stolen trade secrets to benefit foreign enti-
ties and nations. See Kim, supra note 36, at 753. 
63 Arguing that the Chinese government and businesses target people of Chinese descent around the 
world and ask them to steal secrets for China, and as a result, Chinese spies are simply more preva-
lent than spies of other races. John R. Schindler, The Unpleasant Truth About Chinese Espionage, 
OBSERVER (Apr. 22, 2016), https://observer.com/2016/04/the-unpleasant-truth-about-chinese-espio-
nage/ [https://perma.cc/GVE7-TFSQ].  
64 Lingling Wei, Beijing Drops Contentious ‘Made in China 2025’ Slogan, but Policy Remains, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2019, 9:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-drops-a-policy-the-u-s-
dislikes-at-least-in-name-11551795370 [https://perma.cc/H232-ZQCB].  
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trade measures if he determines it necessary for the country’s national se-
curity.65 The Trump Administration and the DOJ developed the China In-
itiative on these national security grounds, in response to China’s per-
ceived eagerness to obtain economic superiority at all costs. China’s rapid 
economic expansion, combined with a record of co-opting Chinese nation-
als to “get ahead,” raised such an alarm inside the White House that the 
Trump Administration felt compelled to react with similar aggression.  
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. What is the China Initiative? 
In November 2018, the DOJ launched the China Initiative with the 
specific goal of clamping down on China’s unfair economic policies, in-
cluding, but not limited to, China’s history of co-opting U.S. intellectual 
property.66 The China Initiative is a sweeping federal plan aimed at satis-
fying the DOJ’s strategic priority of countering Chinese national security 
threats, from the illegal export of military- and space-grade technology to 
suspicions of stealing U.S. scientific ideas.67  
As a basis for launching the China Initiative, the DOJ relied, in 
part, on a pair of damning reports outlining the threat to the U.S. posed by 
Chinese intellectual property, technology, and innovation policy. In March 
2018, an investigative report by the Executive Office of the President con-
cluded that several of China’s trade practices were unreasonable, including 
its outbound investment policies and sponsorship of unauthorized com-
puter intrusions.68 The report claimed that “China’s foreign investment re-
strictions[,] … administrative review, and licensing systems not only exert 
 
65 See generally Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991). 
66 Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 
67 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced to 40 Months in Prison for Conspiring 
to Illegally Export Military- and Space-Grade Technology from the United States to China (Oct. 18, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-40-months-prison-conspiring-ille-
gally-export-military-and-space [https://perma.cc/6C2M-J2VR]; Christopher L. Nasson et al., DOJ 
v. China: Is DOJ Acting as an Instrument of Foreign Policy?, K&L GATES (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.klgates.com/doj-v-china-is-doj-acting-as-an-instrument-of-foreign-policy-10-01-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/5P7F-59HE]; see e.g. Ellen Loanes, China Steals U.S. Designs for New Weapons, 
and It’s Getting Away with ‘the Greatest Intellectual Property Theft in Human History’, BUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2019, 12:44 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/esper-warning-china-intellec-
tual-property-theft-greatest-in-history-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/6V6C-GNMQ]. 
68 Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology 
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, EXEC. 
OFF. OF PRESIDENT 42-45 (Mar. 18, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Sec-
tion%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/BP5K-AQ9Z]. Conduct defined as “unreasonable” if 
it “burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.” Id. at 3. Section 301 of The Act defines an “unreasonable” 
act, practice, or policy as one that “while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the in-
ternational legal rights of the United States is otherwise unfair and inequitable.” Id. 
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great technology transfer pressures on U.S. companies, but also are sub-
stantially more restrictive than those of the U.S. and most other coun-
tries.”69 A June 2018 report further outlined “two major strategies and var-
ious acts, policies, and practices Chinese industrial policy use[d] in seek-
ing to acquire the intellectual property and technologies of the world.”70 
The subsequent investigation warned of deceptive Chinese trade practices, 
including the use of state-sanctioned “security reviews” forcing companies 
to reveal confidential information as a precondition to doing business in 
China.71 The China Initiative empowers a working group of federal pros-
ecutors and investigators with a conglomerate of tools necessary to address 
these serious matters.72 
The National Security Division (NSD) of the DOJ is responsible 
for countering nation-state threats to the country’s critical infrastructure 
and private sector.73 The DOJ’s Criminal Division, in turn, is tasked with 
“aggressively investigat[ing] Chinese companies and individuals for theft 
of trade secrets.”74 Additionally, the China Initiative increases efforts to 
protect critical domestic infrastructure against external threats—including 
foreign direct investment, supply chain threats, and foreign agents—seek-
ing to influence the American public and policymakers without proper reg-
istration.75 The China Initiative is led by the Assistant Attorney General, a 
senior Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Executive, five U.S. Attor-
neys, and several DOJ leaders.76 
B. Why is the China Initiative Problematic? 
The original DOJ China Initiative fact sheet grants sweeping dis-
cretion to federal agencies tasked with carrying out enforcement across 
various industries and focus areas.77 While outlining a list of goals set out 
by the department, the fact sheet is void of any instructions regarding how 
investigation or enforcement should be carried out to achieve those 
 
69 Id. at 44. 
70 White House China Report, supra note 19, at 20; these strategies were identified as (1) “Acquire 
Key Technologies and Intellectual Property From Other Countries, Including the United States[,]” 
and (2) “Capture the Emerging High-Technology Industries That Will Drive Future Economic 
Growth and Many Advancements in the Defense Industry.”. Id. at 2.  
71 Id. at 9.  
72 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 57. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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goals.78 By announcing the China Initiative without a clear policy objec-
tive or enforcement mechanism, the DOJ has the authority to solve the 
Chinese threat by whatever means it deems necessary. 
Since launching the China Initiative in 2018, the DOJ has  
aggressively use[d] existing authorities, including the False Claims 
Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), Foreign Agent Regis-
tration Act, Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, 
NIH and DOD grant rules, university ethics rules and conflicts of in-
terest policy, and export control laws, to target companies and per-
sons seeking to obtain U.S. companies’ intellectual property and 
technology.79 
While these sweeping enforcement measures work to produce 
high-profile arrests and convictions,80 they also incite anxiety and confu-
sion at universities and research institutes across the country as scholars 
and scientists scramble to comply with the new enforcement procedures.81 
The American Council on Education’s (ACE) public request for clarifica-
tion on how to comply with grant rules, ethics rules, and conflicts of inter-
est policies was effectively ignored by the department of education.82 Law 
firms who advise academic institutions fear that the “[i]nitiative has tar-
geted professors acting in good faith who just didn’t understand the rules 
for applying for government grants.”83 Members of the Chinese-American 
academic community feel especially vulnerable, with many living in fear 
that their sincerest efforts to comply with U.S. academic rules will be over-
shadowed by their Chinese ancestry.84 
 
78 Id. at 2. 
79 Dorsey “China Initiative” Task Force, DORSEY, https://www.dorsey.com/-/me-
dia/files/china/dorsey-china-initiative-task-force_fi-
nal.pdf?la=en&hash=A23EED8142206163ECA83769A24E05F1[https://perma.cc/X5YT-FSE3] 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2020, 5:00 PM). 
80 DiCanio et al., supra note 33. 
81 Letter from Terry Hartle, Senior Vice President of ACE, Gov. Rel. & Pub. Aff., to Diane Jones, 
Delegated Under Secretary (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Letter-to-Dept-of-
Education-Regarding-Section-117-of-HEA.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA5W-T7PL]. 
82 See e.g. Id. 




[https://perma.cc/QR3S-T5SE] (quoting Catherine Pan, partner at Dorsey). 
84 Gina Kolta, Vast Dragnet Targets Theft of Biomedical Secrets for China, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/health/china-nih-scientists.html  
[https://perma.cc/5JTG-PYRY] (Statement of Mr. Wu: “We can’t tell who is guilty or innocent[] but 
look at the actual effect on people of Chinese descent, People are living in fear. It is a question of 
impact rather than intent”).  
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IV. HOW THE CHINA INITIATIVE AFFECTS ACADEMIA 
Two of the China Initiative’s goals specifically implicate college 
campuses and research institutes85 as potential targets of Chinese academic 
espionage.86 These goals aim to “[(1)] develop an enforcement strategy 
concerning non-traditional collectors (e.g., researchers in labs, universi-
ties, and the defense industrial base) that are being co[-]opted into trans-
ferring technology contrary to U.S. interests; [and (2)] educate colleges 
and universities about potential threats to academic freedom and open dis-
course from influence efforts on campus.”87  
During a February 2018 U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee hear-
ing, then FBI Director Christopher Wray described Chinese students—
particularly those in advanced science and mathematics programs—as 
“exploiting the very open research and development environment that we 
have, which we [the U.S. society] all revere.”88 Wray further implicated 
professors and scientists of Chinese origin as the type of non-traditional 
collectors who threaten to co-opt U.S. innovation for the Chinese govern-
ment.89 While not the first federal scheme to target a specific racial minor-
ity group in the name of national security,90 the China Initiative’s methods 
for achieving its goals lack the nuance required to avoid discriminatory or 
xenophobic outcomes. The hostile environment created by the China Ini-
tiative is contributing to a decline in international student enrollment 
across the U.S., and many Chinese-American students have expressed fear 
and concern about their overall safety.91 The enforcement of previously 
dormant or underutilized federal reporting statutes in the name of aca-
demic espionage is overloading university administrations and threatening 
to diminish U.S. research funding pathways.92 Furthermore, the broad 
reach of the DOJ’s enforcement power exacerbates the issue of national 
 
85 Fact Sheet, supra note 23.  
86 Academic espionage is defined as the complex practices of using “non-traditional collectors” like 
students and professors to gather intelligence information, in the form of trade secrets and technolog-
ical advancements, from universities or other advanced research settings. Grubbs, supra note 28, at 
235 (2019). 
87 Fact Sheet, supra note 23, at 2. 
88 See Press Release, White House, supra note 51, at 14. 
89 Id.  
90 See e.g. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. 
Ct. 2392 (2018). 
91 Elizabeth Redden, A Welcome Message, or a Warning? INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/31/state-departments-top-education-official-says-
chinese-students-are-welcome-%E2%80%A6 [https://perma.cc/LJU2-3PDS]. 
92 Memorandum from Ted Mitchell, President of ACE, to Stephanie Valentine, PRA Coordinator 
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-Memo-Sec-117.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39VR-C9LE]. 
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security scapegoating experienced by visiting Chinese scholars and Amer-
ican citizens of Asian descent.93  
A. The China Initiative’s Effects on Universities and Research 
Institutions 
1. Decline in International Student Enrollment 
In May 2019, the National Association of Foreign Student Advis-
ers (NAFSA)94 reported that new international student enrollment was 
down 6.6%, double the decrease from 2018.95 This sharp decline is partly 
due to the shrinking size of many countries’ college-age cohorts,96 but 
troubling U.S. policy changes and anti-immigrant rhetoric continue to 
worsen the problem.97 The China Initiative exacerbates the negative per-
ception of the U.S. as an academic destination by creating an increasingly 
hostile environment for aspiring scholars of Asian heritage.  
Since the 1990s, China has been a substantial pipeline for interna-
tional student enrollment in American colleges and universities.98 There-
fore, the DOJ’s heightened scrutiny of students of Chinese descent could 
dramatically affect international student enrollment across U.S. college 
and university campuses that depend on international diversity to prepare 
students for an increasingly globalized world.99 Moreover, while it may be 
“shortsighted to think of this issue solely in terms of revenue: international 
students studying at U.S. colleges and universities …contribute[d] $39 bil-
lion and support[ed] more than 455,000 jobs [in] the U.S. economy during 
 
93 Homepage for End National Security Scapegoating, END NAT’L SEC. SCAPEGOATING, http://end-
nationalsecurityscapegoating.org/#home [https://perma.cc/F3AP-GG7Y] [hereinafter “END NAT’L 
SEC. SCAPEGOATING”]. 
94 NAFSA Losing Talent Report, supra note 16. 
95 Id. at 2. 
96 Countries like Japan and South Korea have simply started having fewer children, meaning they 
have fewer college-age students to send abroad. Justin Fox, Opinion, The International Student 
Slump Isn’t Just About Trump, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opin-
ion/articles/2019-08-21/why-fewer-international-students-are-choosing-u-s-colleges 
[https://perma.cc/H8FS-G9NF]. 
97 These policy changes include increases to international student visa application fees, new ways to 
punish students who violate the conditions of their visas, and intense scrutiny over permit programs 
that enable students to work in the U.S. after graduation. Marnette Federis, Visa Rules are Restrict-
ing the Future of International Students in the U.S., WORLD (June 20, 2019), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-20/visa-rules-are-restricting-future-international-students-us 
[https://perma.cc/HK4E-WYSX].  
98 Nick Anderson et al., Universities Worry About Potential Loss of Chinese Students, WASH. POST 
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the 2017–2018 academic year.”100 The U.S. cannot afford to close the 
pipeline of talent and tuition that supports its education system and drives 
its economy forward. 
International students cite the tenuous sociopolitical environment 
and the general feeling of unwelcomeness as key factors precluding them 
from pursuing an education in the U.S.101 Potential college and university 
students also cite a significant increase in concerns about physical safety 
in the U.S., including gun violence and civil unrest.102 For students of Chi-
nese descent, the increased risk of racial profiling both on campus and in 
American society has caused them to look to other countries—such as 
Canada, Australia, or India—where they feel they can study in a more wel-
coming and less hostile environment.103 Furthermore, since June 2018, the 
state department has shortened the visa length for Chinese graduate stu-
dents studying in sensitive research fields from five years to one year, with 
the chance to reapply annually.104 This added hurdle means that some stu-
dents must fly back to China once a year, even if their graduate program 
is multi-year, risking denial partway through completion of their academic 
studies. The China Initiative further deteriorates the U.S.’ educational en-
vironment at a time when international students are already starting to 
choose other countries in which to pursue their academic aspirations. Chi-
nese students faced with unstable policies and an unsafe environment are 
likely to take their talent, ideas, and tuition dollars to places like Canada, 
Australia, or India, ultimately diminishing the U.S.’ potential as a future 
hub for innovation.  
2. Sudden Enforcement of Section 117 of the HEA: Disclosure of 
Foreign Gifts 
The China Initiative prompted the DOJ to begin using various ad-
ministrative rules or statutes to infer academic espionage from a failure to 
comply with laws that had neither a clear guide for compliance nor a his-
tory of enforcement in the last few decades.105 Section 117 of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965106 is one such formerly dormant statute. The Higher 
Education Act (HEA) was signed into U.S. law on November 8, 1965, as 
 
100 NAFSA Losing Talent Report, supra note 16, at 4. 
101 Id. at 6. 
102 Id. at 8. 
103 Id. at 7. 
104 Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Visa Restrictions for Chinese Students Alarm Academia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jul. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/visa-restrictions-chinese-stu-
dents.html [https://perma.cc/ML2F-KUKM]. 
105 Letter from Terry Hartle to Diane Jones, supra note 81. 
106 Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 
1011f). 
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part of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society domestic agenda.107 The 
HEA's intention was "to strengthen the educational resources of our col-
leges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students in 
postsecondary and higher education."108 It increased federal money given 
to universities, created scholarships, gave students low-interest loans, and 
established a National Teachers Corps.109  
Section 117 of the HEA was part of the act’s reauthorization in 
1986 to deal specifically with the disclosure of foreign gift; however, the 
statute has been largely ignored by the U.S. Department of Education 
(DOE) and other federal policymakers since its enactment.110 The statute 
provides that an institution must file an annual disclosure report with the 
Secretary of Education if it “receives a gift from or enters into a contract 
with a foreign source, the value of which is $250,000 or more…within a 
calendar year.”111 Each report must contain, at minimum, the “aggregate 
amount of such gifts and contracts received,” with additional content re-
quirements depending on the nature of or restrictions on the gift.112 Alt-
hough Congress codified section 117 of the HEA more than thirty years 
ago, the DOE never issued accompanying regulations.113 In order to com-
ply, universities relied solely on two “Dear Colleague” letters, one issued 
in 1995 and the other in 2004, that vaguely outline the section 117 require-
ments.114 The DOE later rescinded the 2004 letter and, on June 22, 2020, 
 
107 Lyndon B. Johnson, President, United States, Remarks at Southwest Texas State College Upon 
Signing the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Nov. 8, 1965), available at https://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-southwest-texas-state-college-upon-signing-the-higher-educa-
tion-act-1965 [https://perma.cc/Y9UN-XNE9] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020, 9:03 PM). 
108 Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1219 (1965). 
109 Id. §§ 101-105. 
110 20 U.S.C. § 1011f (1998); The Department has never issued any regulations implementing the 
statute, instead only issuing two so-called “Dear Colleague” letters in 1995 and 2004 which provide 
limited guidance about how institutions are to comply with the law. For decades, the reported data 
was not even readily accessible, until the Department, through the Federal Student Aid office, start-
ing posting it on a downloadable spreadsheet in 2019. ACE Government Relations, SECTION 117 OF 
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT FOREIGN GIFT AND CONTRACT REPORTING: BACKGROUND AND 
SUMMARY OF ISSUES OF CONCERN 1 (2019). https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Summary-Sec-117-
and-ED-comment-request.pdf [https://perma.cc/P79A-7DC6]. 
111 20 U.S.C. § 1011f(a) (1998). 
112 See e.g., Id. § 1011f (c) (requiring additional disclosures for restricted and conditional gifts). 
113 Letter from Terry Hartle to Diane Joes, supra note 81. 
114 Dep’t of Educ. DCLID GEN-95-12 (Feb. 1, 1995) 
https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/doc0158_bodyoftext.htm [https://perma.cc/XTM2-59PY]; Dep’t of 
Educ. DCLID GEN-04-11 (Oct. 4, 2004) https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/ GEN0411.html 
[https://perma.cc/GKN9-5BM4]; A “Dear Colleague” letter is a guidance document issued by a fed-
eral agency that helps explain and interpret existing laws and regulations. These letters are non-bind-
ing, but they are meant to provide helpful guidance in interpreting existing laws by indicating how a 
particular agency will enforce its own laws or rules. Christy Reese, What are “Dear Colleague” Let-
ters, and Why are They Important? FACTOREGON, Dec. 21, 2016, https://factoregon.org/dear-col-
league-letters/ [https://perma.cc/X6BV-Q62J ].  
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launched an online compliance portal through which institutions are now 
required to report foreign gifts and contracts.115 
Under the China Initiative, the DOE filed a new Information Col-
lection Request (ICR) to obtain information about foreign research fund-
ing under section 117.116 This new ICR is problematic because it originates 
from a vague statute and creates unnecessary administrative burdens, un-
dermines relationships, and restricts foreign investment into U.S. based 
initiatives. The ACE and twenty-nine other higher education organizations 
drafted a letter117 to the DOE arguing that the scope of the proposed ICR 
goes beyond the scope of section 117. The group argued that “aspects of 
the proposed information collection would go far beyond the plain lan-
guage of section 117, clearly directing institutions to make disclosures—
with no statutory basis—of a vastly expanded amount of information and 
documents.”118 The group further suggested that “the manner in which 
other aspects of the proposed information collection is organized and writ-
ten makes the information collection subject to differing reasonable inter-
pretations, with some of those interpretations also well beyond what [sec-
tion] 117 requires.”119 International donors are a key source of capital be-
hind the important research and innovation occurring inside American in-
stitutions. By alienating foreign donors or exceedingly disrupting the flow 
of foreign funds into U.S. schools, the U.S. will have fewer resources to 
maintain its status as an innovation leader.  
The DOE’s new ICR expects institutions to identify individual 
foreign donors by name and address, raising concerns about the loss of 
“anonymous gifts from foreign individuals…which is likely to have a 
chilling effect on the willingness of such donors to make charitable con-
tributions at a time when affordability is a key issue on campuses and 
among policymakers.”120 Furthermore, research institutions and universi-
ties must shoulder the increased administrative costs required to “address 
the volume and nature of the additional information, with no discernable 
benefits.”121 ACE advocates stress that  
 
115 Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos Unveils Enhanced Online Portal for Higher Edu-
cation Institutions to Report Foreign Gifts and Contracts (Jun. 22, 2020), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-unveils-enhanced-online-portal-higher-edu-
cation-institutions-report-foreign-gifts-and-contracts [https://perma.cc/DHM6-D9HS]. 
116 Agency Information Collection Activities, Comment Requests, Foreign Gifts and Contracts Dis-
closures, 84 Fed. 46943 (Sept. 6, 2019). 
117 Memorandum from Ted Mitchell, supra note 92. 
118 Id. at 2. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 10-11. 
121 Id. at 3. 
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[t]he [DOE] has greatly underestimated the time it will take for insti-
tutions to comply with the vast and unnecessary expansion of the for-
eign gift reporting requirements. At the same time, the [DOE]’s in-
formation collection request requires such a large amount of infor-
mation that it will actually undermine, as opposed to increase, the 
transparency of the relationships colleges and universities have with 
foreign individuals and entities, and efforts to identify nefarious con-
duct or inappropriate relationships. The [DOE]’s actions also risk a 
chilling effect on foreign giving and the willingness of foreign enti-
ties to enter contractual agreements with colleges and universities.122 
Failure to comply with section 117 can result in a criminal penalty 
of up to twenty years; therefore, a mere administrative error could lead to 
the indictment of U.S.-based scholars.123 In short, this sudden change in 
enforcement, combined with a lack of clarity from the DOE, is over-
whelming institutional administrative staff. At the same time, the ICR puts 
researchers at risk of criminal fraud prosecution if staff fail to accurately 
disclose pertinent information and documents. 
3. Widespread NIH and FBI Investigations 
The China Initiative also emboldened the DOJ to co-opt the inves-
tigative powers of the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) and FBI to 
further weed out alleged Chinese influence on U.S. research initiatives. On 
August 20th, 2018, the NIH sent 18,000 letters to university administrators 
asking to increase scrutiny of scientists and researchers with foreign 
ties.124 While the letters themselves were vague as to the racial identity of 
the scientist who should be monitored, by March 2019 some institutions 
were reporting that every single researcher flagged by NIH was Chinese 
or Chinese-American.125 At the 2020 World Economic Forum in Davos, 
the head of Beijing’s Capital Medical University, Rao Yi, criticized the 
U.S. for “institut[ing] policies specifically targeting scientists of Chinese 
 
122 Id. 
123 See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1343. 
124 Gina Kolta, supra note 84; “These efforts will be supported by a working group of the Advisory 
Committee to the (NIH) Director that will tap experts in academic research and security to develop 
robust methods to: 1. Improve accurate reporting of all sources of research support, financial inter-
ests, and relevant affiliations; 2. Mitigate the risk to IP security while continuing NIH's long tradition 
of collaborations with foreign scientists and institutions; and 3. Explore additional steps to protect 
the integrity of peer review.” Letter from Francis S. Collins, Director of NIH, to Colleagues (Aug. 
20, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/NIH%20Foreign %20In-
fluence%20Letter%20to%20Grantees%2008-20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XYB-64QX]. 
125 Jeffrey Mervis, NIH Letters Asking about Undisclosed Foreign Ties Rattle U.S. Univ., SCI. MAG. 
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/03/nih-letters-asking-about-undisclosed-for-
eign-ties-rattle-us-universities 
[https://perma.cc/H8MY-8N87]. 
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origin in biomedical science.”126 Rao, a former Chinese-American who 
spent more than two decades studying and working in the U.S. before re-
turning to China and withdrawing his U.S. citizenship, was outspoken in 
his belief that the U.S.’ approach was hurting the global scientific land-
scape, expressing that “[at a] global level in science, there’s no national-
ism. There [is] only Trumpism in the U.S., which is damaging interna-
tional collaboration.”127 
The NIH and FBI investigations target scientists and researchers 
who fail to accurately complete NIH Foreign Financial Interest reports or 
properly disclose their involvement in China’s “Thousand Talent Plan” 
(TTP).128 The TTP is a Chinese government-run program that seeks to re-
cruit Chinese talent, as well as foreign academics and entrepreneurs, to 
work in science and technology fields in China.129 The NIH concluded that 
the program, which was established in 2008, was used by the Chinese gov-
ernment to obtain confidential NIH grant applications and to establish so-
called shadow labs in China, where NIH-funded research could be repro-
duced.130 NIH Foreign Financial Interest reporting, similar to reporting un-
der HEA section 117, was scarcely enforced and sporadically regulated 
until the announcement of the China Initiative in 2018.131 Even so, the NIH 
used tactics such as data mining to flag cases in which scientists publicly 
mentioned relationships to foreign entities that were not otherwise logged 
in the NIH database.132 The 2018 NIH letters to university administrators 
demanded disclosure of “all forms of other support and financial interests, 
 
126 Éanna Kelly, Crackdown on Scientists from China is Trump-led Intimidation, SCIENCE BUSINESS 




128 Compliance with Foreign Grants, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/grants-contracts/compliance-foreign-grants [https://perma.cc/Z33K-
3D5T] (last viewed Sept. 25, 2019). 
129 James Jin Kang, The Thousand Talents Plan is part of China’s long quest to become the global 





130 Jeffery Mervis, NIH Reveals Its Formula for Tracking Foreign Influences, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 4, 
2019), https://www.sciencemagazinedigital.org/sciencemagazine/04_october_2019_Main/Mo-
bilePagedArticle.action?articleId=1527182#articleId1527182 [https://perma.cc/SKQ6-NFTC].  
131 While DOJ had historically focused on thefts of trade secrets and intellectual property from pri-
vate U.S. companies or federal agencies, the China Initiative expanded the government’s focus to the 
alleged threat posed by individuals working within academic institutions in 2018. The China Initia-
tive Heads to School, JD SUPRA (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-china-initi-
ative-heads-to-school-47755/ [https://perma.cc/2PYZ-Z6KR]. 
132 Mervis, supra note 130.  
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including support coming from foreign governments or other foreign enti-
ties,”133 despite much of the information being publicly available.  
By February 2020, the House Committee on Oversight and Re-
form expressed alarm over the growing number of NIH investigations that 
targeted ethnically Chinese scientists.134 In letters addressed separately to 
the FBI and NIH Directors, lawmakers shared their concern that ethnically 
Chinese scientists were being racially profiled while trying to work in the 
U.S.135 While acknowledging the legitimate need to investigate concerns 
of intellectual property theft and espionage, the House Committee high-
lighted evidence that the FBI was disproportionately arresting and charg-
ing Chinese-American scientists who turned out to be innocent of all 
charges.136 The lawmakers further quoted the former president of the Com-
mittee of 100,137 Frank Wu, saying that he was "getting calls and emails 
constantly now from ethnic Chinese–even those who are U.S. citizens–
who feel threatened” by racial profiling, discrimination, and unfair treat-
ment by government officials.138  
The U.S. has a long history of over-prosecuting innocent Chinese 
“spies” for industrial, economic, and academic espionage related 
charges.139 This history, combined with overbroad federal statutes crimi-
nalizing erroneous funding reports, has created the newly coined crime of 
“researching while Asian.”140 The DOJ is adamant that their approach to 
the China Initiative is not specifically targeting Chinese people, but rather 
 
133 Letter from Francis S. Collins to Colleagues, supra note 124; disclosure requirements are outlined 
under 42 CFR Part 50, Subpart F, Objectivity of Research. 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.604-50.605 (2016). 
134 Cristina Marcos, House Democrats Launch Probe into NIH and FBI Suspecting Chinese Ameri-




136 Letter from Jamie Raskin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties & Judy Chu, 
Chair, Cong. Asian Pac.Am. Caucus, to Christopher Way, Dir., FBI, H.R. Comm. on Oversight and 




137 The Committee of 100 (C100) is a non-partisan leadership organization of prominent Chinese 
Americans in business, government, academia, and the arts. For more information, see Charlie Woo, 
Frank Wu Steps Down as President of Committee of 100, COMM. 100 (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.committee100.org/press_release/frank-h-wu-steps-down-as-president-of-committee-of-
100/, [https://perma.cc/CZV2-XNPR].  
138 Letter from Francis S. Collins to Colleagues, supra note 124. 
139 MARA HVISTENDAHL, THE SCIENTIST AND THE SPY: A TRUE STORY OF CHINA, THE FBI, AND 
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 103, 153, 155 (Penguin Random House, 1st ed. 2020). 
140 Peter Walden, Chinese Scientists Guilty of ‘Researching While Asian’ in Trump’s America, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jun. 29, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-maga-
zine/long-reads/article/3016267/chinese-scientists-guilty-researching-while, [https://perma.cc/86BY-
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is meant to target the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist 
Party. However, current evidence and the prosecutorial record suggest oth-
erwise. 
B. The China Initiative’s Effects on Researchers 
1. The Tip of the Iceberg  
The “China Initiative” is hardly the first state-sponsored program 
targeting Chinese people trying to work, live, or study in the U.S.141 Since 
2012, federal prosecutors have implicated China, or individuals of Chinese 
descent, in more than 80 percent of all cases involving actual or attempted 
theft of critical economic and scientific intellectual property.142 As ethni-
cally Chinese individuals find themselves increasingly more likely to be 
arrested or charged with crimes related to espionage, they also find them-
selves twice as likely to have their charges dropped, be acquitted at trial, 
or plead to a lesser charge before trial.143 As mentioned above, experts 
acknowledge that it is possible that ethnically-Chinese scientists are 
simply committing more intellectual property crimes.144 They also warn, 
however, of the possibility that Chinese and other Asians are dispropor-
tionately prosecuted, and often falsely prosecuted, due to specific racial 
targeting, implicit bias, or intense DOJ pressure to hold someone account-
able for “[t]he long-term existential threat [posed by China] to the security 
of our nation.”145 Leaders in the Asian-American scientific community do 
not dispute that such crimes have occurred, nor that a need to prevent them 
exists, but they argue that a blanket approach to investigating scientists 
 
141 See e.g. Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (prohibiting all immigra-
tion of Chinese laborers); Immigration Act of 1924, Pub.L. No. 68–139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (pre-
vented immigration from Asia, set quotas on the number of immigrants from the Eastern Hemi-
sphere, and provided funding and an enforcement mechanism to carry out the longstanding ban on 
other immigrants); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 
113-6, 127 Stat. 198 (2013) (prohibiting NASA from using any funds “to effectuate the hosting of 
official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA”). 
142 Nancy Hungerford, Chinese Theft of Trade Secrets on the Rise, the US Justice Department 
Warns, CNBC WORLD POLITICS (Sep. 22, 2019, 11:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/23/chi-
nese-theft-of-trade-secrets-is-on-the-rise-us-doj-warns.html, [https://perma.cc/F89Q-SWGW].  
143 when compared to defendants with “western” last names. See Kim, supra note 36, at 754; The 
study analyzed the ethnicity of individuals prosecuted under the Economic Espionage Act from 1997 
to 2015 by coding each defendant’s last name as either “Chinese,” “Other Asian” (including East 
Asian, South Asian, and Southeast Asian names), “Western named” (including Latino and Eastern 
European names), or “Arabic.” Id. t 782.  
144 Id. at 754. 
145 Id.; quoting William Evanina, the head of U.S counterintelligence, in a press briefing in Washing-
ton, DC on February 6, 2020. Caitlin Yilek, ‘Existential threat’: US warns of Chinese espionage ca-
pabilities, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Feb. 6, 2020 12:10 PM) https://www.washingtonex-
aminer.com/news/existential-threat-us-warns-of-chinese-espionage-capabilities 
[https://perma.cc/3THY-689Z]. 
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who are ethnically Chinese is both disruptive and counterintuitive.146 An 
anti-Chinese climate in the U.S. could cut U.S. scientists off from open 
lines of academic discourse that are crucial for the ongoing exchange of 
ideas that lead to innovative breakthroughs.  
False allegations prior to the China Initiative proved devastating 
to Chinese-American scientists who spent years building lives and pres-
tigious careers in the United States. For example, Xiafen "Sherry" Chen, a 
former hydrologist for the National Weather Service (NWS), was arrested 
in 2014 for allegedly using a stolen password to download secret infor-
mation about U.S. dams to be shared with Chinese officials.147 Chen’s 
charges were eventually dropped in early 2015,148 but Chen later lost her 
job with the NWS and found herself locked in various legal battles with 
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Department of Com-
merce, and, most recently, the U.S. government.149 Similarly, Dr. 
Xiaoxing Xi, the former chairman of the Temple University physics de-
partment, was arrested at gunpoint in 2015 for allegedly sharing infor-
mation with entities in China “concerning a ‘pocket heater’ belonging to 
Superconductor Technologies Inc.,”150 only to have his charges dropped 
by prosecutors due to inaccurate and conflicting evidence.151 Even though 
the arrest failed to result in a prosecution, it cast a shadow of suspicion 
over Dr. Xi, ultimately causing the suspension from his job as a professor 
and the removal of his title as the chairman of the physics department.152 
By rushing to arrest Chinese scientists before fully corroborating key ele-
ments of the case, federal prosecutors ruin the lives and careers of innocent 
individuals.  
 
146 Shan Lu et al., Racial Profiling Harms Science, 363 SCIENCE 1290, 1290 (2019). DOI: 
10.1126/science.aaw6854. 
147 Nicole Perlroth, Acused of Spying for China Until She Wasn’t, (May 9, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com /2015/05/10/business/accused-of-spying-for-china-until-she-wasnt.html, 
[https://perma.cc/VVK7-U43S]. 
148 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, United States v. Xiafen Chen, No. 3:14-cr-
00149 (S.D. Ohio Oct 16, 2014). 
149 Sherry Chen Legal Defense Fund, 2018-Now: Post-MSPB Decision Developments and Actions 
(2019), https://www.sherrychendefensefund.org/2018-now.html, [https://perma.cc/W6G3-HJM7]; 
see e.g. Amended Complaint, Xiafen Chen v. United States, No. 1:19-cv-00045, 2019 BL 322990 
(S.D. Ohio Sep. 23, 2019). 
150 Complaint at 1, 15, Xi v Haugen, No. 2:17-cv-02132 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2017). 
151 Matt Apuzzo, U.S. Drops Charges that Professor Shared Technology with China, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/us/politics/us-drops-charges-that-professor-
shared-technology-with-china.html [https://perma.cc/GR8F-SGPB]. 
152 Matt Apuzzo, Former Espionage Suspect Sues, Accusing F.B.I. of Falsifying Evidence, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/fbi-xi-xiaoxing.html 
[https://perma.cc/VVF5-2DLD]. 
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In 2016, the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus 
(CAPAC) wrote a letter to then Inspector General Michael Horowitz de-
manding “an independent investigation into whether race, ethnicity, or na-
tional origin played a part in recent cases in which Asian Americans have 
been wrongfully arrested and indicted for alleged espionage.”153 Rather 
than conducting an investigation, the DOJ subsequently issued a press re-
lease announcing new Department-wide implicit bias training for all of its 
law enforcement agents and prosecutors.154 Since the press release, the 
DOJ has been silent on the implementation or effectiveness of such train-
ing, yet the department has doubled down on its scrutiny and suspicion of 
individuals of Chinese heritage.155 
2. A “Spike” in Prosecutions  
In a press conference from the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies on February 6th, 2020, a panel of U.S. attorneys warned that 
“[r]esearchers in academia and industry who work with Chinese institu-
tions should expect a ‘spike’ in prosecutions this year as a result of a U.S. 
government initiative to stop economic espionage.”156 By the end of 2020, 
the DOJ boasted thousands of open investigations involving China, with 
the “FBI open[ing] a new China-related counterintelligence case nearly 
every 10 hours.”157 While FBI officials spoke candidly about their success 
in prosecuting crimes of “academic espionage,” they failed to mention that 
 
153 Letter from Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus to Inspector General Michael E. Horo-
witz (May 13, 2016) https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bysg-cpS_9OIU09WUXhkemxrZzQ/view 
[https://perma.cc/V473-WC6Y]. 
154 Department of Justice Announces New Department-Wide Implicit Bias Training for Personnel, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFF. PUB. AFF. (June 27, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-jus-
tice-announces-new-department-wide-implicit-bias-training-personnel [https://perma.cc/K9VX-
TZVU].  
155 See Press Release, White House, supra note 51. 
156 Catherine Matacic, U.S. Attorneys Warn of Upcoming ‘Spike’ in Prosecutions Related to China 
Ties, SCI. MAG. (Feb. 7, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/02/us-attorneys-
warn-upcoming-spike-prosecutions-related-china-ties [https://perma.cc/3W5M-NV2U]. A video of 
the press conference is available at Center for Strategic & International Studies, China Initiative 
Conference, YOUTUBE (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1dtxt82HFE&feature=emb_logo [https://perma.cc/7AEF-
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157 FBI Director Christopher Wray’s Opening Remarks: China Initiative Conference, CTR. FOR 
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most “espionage” claims were now being inferred through fraud prosecu-
tions.158 Although the DOJ ramped up its investigations of Chinese nation-
als and Chinese-Americans, definitive findings of espionage against such 
targets are much less tangible. By using the China Initiative to prosecute 
researchers for fraudulent reporting under the HEA or NIH guidelines, the 
DOJ can still remove alleged Chinese “threats” while avoiding the heavy 
burden of proof required to prosecute under more rigorous laws, such as 
the EEA.159 Now, experts warn that “the aggressive enforcement posture 
of the China Initiative is on full display—even if the factual record con-
tains no evidence of [actually spying for China].”160 
The China Initiative’s “spike” in prosecutions now targets both 
ethnically Chinese scientists and ethnically American scientists with close 
ties or relationships with Chinese scientists or institutions. High profile 
indictments like those of University of Kansas researcher Franklin Tao; 
Emory University neuroscientist Xiao-jiang Li; or former Harvard chem-
istry chair Dr. Christopher Lieber exemplify the China Initiative’s wide-
spread effect on scientific researchers.  
In 2019, Feng “Franklin” Tao, an associate professor at the Uni-
versity of Kansas (KU) Center for Environmentally Beneficial Catalysis 
(CEBC), was charged with wire fraud and program fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1343 and 666.161 A superseding indictment filed on January 15, 2020 
alleged that Tao submitted false conflict of interest forms to KU, and thus 
“obtained by fraud, property worth at least $5,000.”162 By failing to dis-
close an active affiliation with a Chinese university on two KU conflict-
of-interest forms, Tao now faces “up to 20 years in federal prison and a 
 
158 Before the China Initiative, federal prosecutors could only bring claims of espionage under the 
Economic Espionage Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32 (1996).  
159 The Economic Espionage Act provides two statutory avenues for criminal prosecution: (1) eco-
nomic espionage, which involves the misappropriation of a trade secret with the intent to benefit a 
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, Id. § 1831; and (2) trade secret theft, 
which involves the misappropriation of a trade secret with the intent to convert the trade secret to the 
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner and to injure the owner of the trade secret, Id. § 
1832. 
160 Christopher Nasson, David Peet, & Neil Smith, DOJ v. China: Is DOJ Acting as an Instrument of 
Foreign Policy?, JD SUPRA (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/doj-v-china-is-doj-
acting-as-an-64952/, [https://perma.cc/V77C-T5MU].  
161 Sealed Indictment, United States v. Tao, 2:19-cr-20025-JAR Doc 1 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2019); 
Mot. to Dismiss Indictment at 1, United States v. Tao, 2:19-cr-20052-JAR Doc. 30 (D. Kan. Nov. 
17, 2019). 
162 Superseding Indictment at 12, 13, United States v. Tao, 2:19-cr-20052-JAR. (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 
2020). 
A Second Superseding indictment brings Professor Tao’s total charges to 10: 7 for wire fraud and 3 
for making false statements. None of the indictments make any mention of IP theft or cooption of 
protected trade secrets or scientific materials. Second Superseding Indictment at 11-14, United States 
v. Tao, 2:19-cr-20052-JAR. (D. Kan. Jun. 24, 2020).  
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fine up to $250,000.”163 In a motion to dismiss filed on August 14, 2020, 
counsel for Tao stressed that “the government has turned a garden-variety 
employment issue that is well within the jurisdiction of a Human Re-
sources department … into a federal case involving nearly a dozen felony 
charges.”164  
Xiao-jiang Li, a neuroscientist and biomedical researcher at 
Emory University, was also charged in 2019 with program fraud under 18 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(l)(A), for “theft or bribery concerning programs receiving 
[f]ederal funds.”165 Li, who had already been fired from Emory in the wake 
of his investigation,166 allegedly accepted a full salary from Emory, paid 
in part by federal research grants, despite spending a significant portion of 
the time concurrently working in China.167 In May 2020, federal prosecu-
tors abruptly dismissed all fraud charges against Li; instead, the former 
Emory professor pled guilty to filing a false tax return and was sentenced 
to one year probation.168 The DOJ was careful to point out that Li was 
living “two, separate lives” but could not prove that he was engaging in 
intellectual property theft or any other activities amounting to espionage.  
In January 2020, Dr. Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard’s chemistry 
department, was arrested on charges in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1001(a)(2), making false statements to the agency of the U.S. govern-
ment.169 Later, in July 2020, the DOJ added charges of tax fraud and al-
leged failure to disclose a foreign bank account related to Dr. Lieber’s sup-
posed failure to disclose his research and related income linked to 
China.170 Federal prosecutors claimed that Dr. Lieber, one of the world’s 
leading nanoelectronics experts, failed to divulge a $1.5 million research 
partnership with China’s Wuhan University of Technology, and lied about 
his involvement with the TTP.171 Dr. Lieber, who was placed on indefinite 
administrative leave from Harvard, faces up to five years in prison and a 
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$250,000 fine for the false statement claims, three years in prison and a 
$100,000 fine for the false tax returns, and an additional five years in 
prison and a $250,000 fine for failing to disclose his foreign bank ac-
count.172 Upon entering a plea of not guilty on all charges, counsel for Dr. 
Lieber ardently maintained their client’s innocence, noting that “‘the gov-
ernment has this wrong’ and that ‘when justice is done, Charlie's good 
name will be restored.’” 173 
By indicting scientists, like those mentioned above, on allegations 
of fraudulent reporting rather than economic or academic espionage (or 
other more narrowly tailored crimes), the DOJ conflates their “spike” in 
prosecutions with “success” in weeding out Chinese intellectual property 
thieves. It is impossible to tell whether such arrests are rooted in adminis-
trative oversight or bona fide nefarious intentions. In addition, by intensi-
fying distrust and suspicion of individuals with ties to China, the DOJ’s 
actions discourage open communication between U.S. researchers and the 
rest of the scientific community. At a time when scientific discovery is 
becoming increasingly globalized,174 a “spike” in prosecutions of interna-
tionally connected scientists in the U.S. will likely result in a reduction to 
the United States’ innovative capacity. 
3. Dismissed, Let Go, or Summarily Fired  
By December 2020, the DOJ reported that more than 1,000 for-
eign researchers affiliated with China had left the U.S. in the wake of 
China Initiative crackdowns.175 In some cases, researchers were let go at 
the first sign of an investigation amidst fears of reputational harm or loss 
of critical federal research funding.176 Because the NIH is the main public 
funder of research in the U.S., the loss of its support would be devastating 
to most institutions.  
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In May 2019, neuroscientists Li Xiao-Jiang and Li Shihua were 
fired from Emory University “simultaneously without any notice or op-
portunity…to respond to unverified accusations.”177 The two researchers, 
known for their research on Huntington disease, are both U.S. citizens and 
worked at Emory for over twenty-three years. The University immediately 
closed the pair’s joint laboratory, shut down their websites, and ordered 
four Chinese postdoctoral students working in the lab to leave the U.S. 
within thirty days.178 Publicly available papers published by the Lis in 
high-profile journals, as well as biographical information posted online, 
have widely disclosed the couple’s Chinese funding and affiliations,179 yet 
the NIH insisted that they were engaging in widespread program decep-
tion.  
The MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas similarly 
ousted top epidemiologists in April 2019 after receiving NIH e-mails de-
scribing conflicts of interest or unreported foreign income by five faculty 
members.180 Dr. Wu Xifeng, a naturalized U.S. citizen who had worked at 
MD Anderson for twenty-seven years, was pressured to resign from her 
position and has since relocated to the School of Public Health at Zhejiang 
University in Hangzhou, China.181 Simultaneously, Hung Mien-Chie, a 
Taiwanese-born cancer researcher, retired from his position as MD Ander-
son’s vice president for basic research to take a job as president of China 
Medical University in Taichung, Taiwan.182 Although Hung did not pub-
licly connect his resignation with the ongoing NIH probe, he previously 
raised concerns about possible racial profiling at institutions across the 
country, expressing hope that “increased security measures will not be 
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used to tarnish law-abiding scientists.”183 Of the five researchers under in-
creased scrutiny by the NIH, three were pressured to leave MD Anderson, 
a fourth was removed through termination proceedings, and the fifth was 
eventually cleared, but not without rumors, confusion, anxiety, and prob-
able racial profiling. 184 The DOJ’s wholesale investigative approach is 
driving talented scientists out of their jobs, out of the country, and out of 
the domestic pipeline for future U.S. innovative discovery. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR A REFORMED APPROACH 
The China Initiative is far-reaching in nature given the new pow-
ers granted to federal agencies working to counter the “nation state threats” 
posed to the U.S. by China. Despite the collateral damage described above, 
analysts expect the Biden Administration to continue the program, with 
only a few minor changes made for good reason.185 The national security 
threat posed by China is real and the interception of Chinese intellectual 
property theft is important, but the Biden Administration must address the 
DOJ’s indiscriminate approach with respect to non-traditional collectors. 
The DOJ's use of fraud statutes to infer academic espionage means that 
researchers of Chinese-descent or with ties to China are “having their lives 
wrecked unnecessarily”186 regardless of nefarious intent to benefit China. 
In order to achieve the goals of the China Initiative and preserve the integ-
rity of the U.S. academic community, the DOJ and the Biden Administra-
tion should implement the following reforms to the program’s current 
wholesale enforcement approach. 
A. Increase DOJ Understanding of the Nature of Scientific 
Research 
Advanced scientific research is an inherently public process that 
relies on robust collaboration and international discourse. While privately 
funded research has certainly been on the rise,187 a significant amount of 
 
183 Id. 
184 Marva Hvistendahl, MD Anderson Clears Researcher Flagged by NIH for Not Disclosing For-
eign Ties, SCI. MAG. (May 30, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/05/md-anderson-
clears-researcher-flagged-nih-not-disclosing-foreign-ties [https://perma.cc/SWL2-7Y2G].  
185 Eric Tucker, Justice Dept.’s China focus likely to continue under Biden, AP NEWS (Nov. 19, 
2020), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-beijing-coronavirus-pandemic-china-intellectual-
property-07c4ba551790692b8757aa5d2218764e [https://perma.cc/LCE8-VYUZ]. 
186 Quoting Washington defense lawyer, Peter Zeidenberg, who represents Chinese professors across 
the country. Id.  
187 By 2018, private sector spending on scientific research outperformed US government spending by 
three to one. In contrast, federal government funding supported 70% of the basic research conducted 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Bernard B. Tulsi, As Federal Research Funds Recede, the Private Sector is 
 
2020]  Red Scare or Red Herring 163 
 
research continues to occur in the public sector for the purpose of advanc-
ing greater social good.188 The sweeping nature of the DOJ’s China Initi-
ative exposes the department’s failure to understand the “difference 
between [s]cientific [r]esearch being conducted at [r]esearch … 
[i]nstitutions and R&D products development taking place at private 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies.”189 In a rebuke of the current 
federal bureaucracy, one scientist warned that while Americans continue 
to “fight among ourselves, China is getting ahead with its research 
programs because its [s]cientific [r]esearchers are not distracted by the 
toxic atmosphere of distrust and paranoia.”190 Chinese-American scientists 
and researchers are increasingly frustrated with the ongoing scrutiny of 
their ties to Chinese institutions, in part because almost all NIH-funded 
research is published in publicly available scientific journals.191 Even 
proprietary data destined for patent applications eventually finds its way 
into the public realm: either as a published work in a scientific journal, or 
later through the USPTO’s exhaustive public patent database.192  
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic further exposed gaps in the 
government’s understanding of the nature of scientific research. While 
scientists from around the globe put all other research on hold to contain 
the virus, the Trump Administration continued to tout a nationalist agenda, 
ripe with terms like “biotech arms race,” and the classic, “America 
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first.”193 Scientific progress in the twenty-first century relies heavily on the 
efficient transmission of research results to the scientific community via 
open-access platforms. During COVID-19, scientists from across the 
globe, including the U.S., used public databases like bioRxiv194 to 
collaborate on the creation of a vaccine or treatment.195 By April 2020, 
“creative, persistent[,] and indefatigable researchers [were] working on 
more than 140 experimental drug treatments and vaccines [for the virus], 
cooperating across company lines and national borders.”196 At the time, 
President Trump remained ardent in the U.S.’ commitment to being “first” 
to produce a vaccine, but scientists stressed that “trying to sew a ‘Made in 
the USA’ label onto scientific research gets complicated.”197  
Academic and other scientific research, as well as the public 
patent system, have historically relied on international collaboration and 
robust public discourse. If it really is NIH policy to make the results and 
accomplishments of the activities that it funds available to the public,198 it 
seems counterintuitive that the NIH or other federal agencies would seek 
to alienate students, scientists, and scholars over fear that they may be 
sharing their results and accomplishments with the wrong people. While 
it is clear that some publicly funded research must be protected on national 
security grounds,199 the blanket approach to scrutinizing scientists with ties 
to China in every discipline of publicly funded science is surely too broad, 
and ultimately harmful. The DOJ would benefit from a more nuanced ap-
proach where research is categorized carefully based on actual risk to na-
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tional security. Ethnically Chinese researchers conducting NIH biomedi-
cal research or government funded environmental projects may seem like 
tempting political targets at a time when U.S.-China tensions are high, but 
alienating such individuals in these highly open and collaborative fields is 
both futile and self-harming to the U.S.  
The DOJ should end its wholesale approach to prosecuting scien-
tists and researchers for failing to comply with foreign gift reporting stat-
utes, especially considering that, until June 2020, the DOE offered little to 
no guidance to institutions on how to effectively or accurately comply with 
these statutes.200 The tracking of foreign gifts and contracts is an important 
task, but inferring academic espionage from an error in reporting fails to 
distinguish mere administrative oversights from bona fide threats of espi-
onage. HEA and NIH reporting statutes are inappropriate tools for catch-
ing spies because compliance with such statutes is an administrative job 
that rarely falls on the alleged spies in the first place.201 As institutions get 
up to speed with new online reporting mechanisms,202 the DOJ should of-
fer a grace period to allow good faith compliance with laws that were oth-
erwise unregulated for more than three decades.203 In the meantime, the 
DOJ should work with the scientific community to classify research areas 
based on actual risk to national security.  
B. Increase Diversity, Implicit Bias, and Racial Profiling Education 
The DOJ does not provide data on the demographics of current 
U.S. attorneys, but 2018 diversity statistics show that just 5% of U.S, at-
torneys’ office employees are of Asian heritage.204 For an organization that 
claims to “value diversity in [its] workforce and embrace the cultural and 
demographic dimensions of our country,”205 the DOJ has categorically 
fallen short of its goal to “attract and retain a workforce that represents the 
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range of personal and professional backgrounds, and experiences and per-
spectives that arise from differences of culture and circumstances.”206 If 
nearly 95% of the U.S. attorneys responsible for investigating and prose-
cuting crimes related to national security overwhelmingly represent just 
one demographic, it is impossible to know whether their decisions to over-
prosecute ethnically Chinese individuals is rooted in bona fide suspicion 
or implicit bias and racial profiling. Implicit bias is defined as the uncon-
scious attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and 
everyday decision-making.207 Racial profiling, in the context of law en-
forcement, is defined as “the systematic association of sets of physical, 
behavioral or psychological characteristics with particular offences and 
their use as a basis for making law enforcement decisions.”208 Due to this 
racial profiling and implicit bias in law enforcement, “prosecutors may be 
more likely to view ambiguous evidence of guilt as conclusive when it 
involves an Asian suspect because that evidence comports with their 
preexisting image of Asians as spies.” 209 Prosecutors may honestly believe 
evidence is stronger than it really is simply because they lack the training 
necessary to identify and interrogate their implicit prejudices.  
While working to diversify the field of U.S. attorneys to include 
more Asian-Americans,210 the DOJ should also implement tangible 
measures to adequately train current DOJ prosecutors. The DOJ was 
praised in 2016 when it announced implicit bias training, 211 but the de-
partment has failed to provide information about the training’s success, 
either explicitly through reported metrics or implicitly through its prose-
cutorial patterns. The DOJ should not only implement a more transparent 
plan for addressing implicit bias and racial profiling through trainings, but 
it should also ensure that such practices become a routine part of everyday 
DOJ operations. The following recommendations incorporate the ideas of 
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advocacy groups, scholars, and the United Nations (UN), for addressing 
implicit bias and racial profiling inside the DOJ. 
1. Recommendations on Implicit Bias Training 
Calls for an in-depth investigation of the DOJ’s “policies and 
practices that led to [the] apparent pattern and practice of wrongful prose-
cutions [of Chinese-American scientists]” have gone largely unanswered 
since 2016.212 In 2016, the DOJ was vocal about its newfound commitment 
to implicit bias training;213 yet, without follow-up programs or reporting, 
there is no way to know whether the DOJ is progressing toward those de-
clared goals. Implicit bias training is evidently not a cure-all for wrongful 
prosecutions based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, but “the trainings 
themselves are still valuable as a palatable entryway into discussing dis-
parities and the need for reform.”214 In order to address racial disparities 
within the DOJ while also easing the anxiety of the Asian-American sci-
entific community, the DOJ should be transparent about how implicit bias 
training is implemented, tracked, and reviewed inside the department.  
Effective implicit bias training is a vigorous process that requires 
“more than just a few hours in a classroom.”215 Experts compare reducing 
implicit bias over a period of time to breaking a bad habit, a process that 
first requires awareness of one’s prejudice; then a desire to reduce it, an 
understanding of the times and places in which one’s prejudice operates; 
and finally, an understanding of how to consistently use tools that help 
replace biased responses with egalitarian responses.216 For an implicit bias 
training program to be successful, Professor Patricia Devine and her col-
leagues recommend coaching individuals on five key strategies for reduc-
ing implicit bias,217 then continuing to follow up with bias trainees on a 
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regular basis.218 Generally, “implicit bias training should provide exercises 
that help [trainees] experience the emotions associated with being on the 
receiving end of negative or positive biases,”219 and develop tools and 
skills to respond in a more inclusive way. Ultimately, to measure the ef-
fectiveness of such training, an organization can define and track specific 
measurable outcomes over time related to the training’s specific goals.220 
Here, the most obvious measurable sign of success would be a reduction 
in the number of false charges brought against Chinese-Americans, indi-
cating that the DOJ has shifted its view of Asian-Americans from one of 
implied suspicion to unambiguous neutrality.  
2. Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Racial Profiling  
The UN describes racial profiling as “incompatible with the pro-
tection of human rights [yet] found in practice among police, customs, im-
migration and national security agencies. It is often manifested in the con-
text of …targeting for surveillance or immigration decisions carried out 
by such agencies.”221 In the U.S., "driving while black" is an ironic name 
given to the racial profiling of African American drivers, implying that a 
police officer will pull over an African American motorist largely because 
of racial profiling rather than any visible violation of traffic law.222 “Re-
searching while Asian,” as mentioned above,223 similarly scoffs at the 
DOJ’s history of profiling Asian-Americans as spies. 
The UN Department of Global Communications and the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights recommend that every member 
state develop a legal framework to prohibit racial discrimination and the 
practice of racial profiling.224 The High Commissioner for Human Rights 
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also suggests that countries draft “formal and explicit guidelines that spe-
cifically prohibit ethnic or racial profiling and are intended to help [law 
enforcement] make suspicion-led [as opposed to racially-motivated] deci-
sions.”225 Other recommendations for reducing racial profiling include 
community engagement, raising awareness, diverse recruitment, and de-
tailed data collection to be used to measure departmental accountability.226  
 In 2017, representative John Conyers Jr. of Michigan in-
troduced the End Racial Profiling Act to the 115th Congress. The bill had 
the potential to fulfill the above-mentioned UN recommendations.227 After 
passing through various house subcommittees and securing eighty-one co-
sponsors; however, the House never voted on the bill and it was never 
enacted.228 Legislation like the End Racial Profiling Act of 2017 could 
dramatically transform the DOJ while also providing peace of mind and 
tangible solutions to communities of color, including Asian Americans. 
Representative Conyers’s bill should be reintroduced, and Congress 
should enact the End Racial Profiling Act as an initial step towards 
“[b]uilding bridges, solidarity and connecting efforts across Asian and 
non-Asian communities…to achiev[e] a collective vision for social jus-
tice.”229 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The China Initiative is a sweeping federal plan aimed at satisfying 
the DOJ’s strategic priority of countering the national security threat posed 
by China. The Initiative is designed, in part, to protect the United States’ 
status as a leader in global innovation and scientific discourse. The DOJ’s 
enforcement approach to “non-traditional collectors,” meant to protect the 
United States’ innovative advantage, is unnecessarily over-broad and thus 
tends to stifle innovation by exacerbating existing issues of racial animus 
and creating even more uncertainty for U.S.-based researchers and institu-
tions.  
The U.S. is justified in its concern that China may be using unfair 
practices to achieve economic prominence. Nevertheless, the current ap-
proach to enforcing the China Initiative is hurting rather than helping the 
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U.S. in its efforts remain a hub for scientific discovery, technological 
growth, and academic discourse. While the China Initiative’s sweeping 
enforcement measures may succeed in stopping some intellectual property 
theft and producing high-profile convictions, they also incite anxiety, fear, 
and confusion at universities and research institutes across the country. 
Chinese students, who comprise the largest cohort of international enrol-
lees at American universities, are alienated by the increasingly suspicious 
and hostile environment for aspiring academics of Asian heritage. Univer-
sity administrators are paralyzed by the possibility that an administrative 
error may lead to the imprisonment of a respected colleague. Scientists and 
researchers—marred by investigations, arrests, and removals—are osten-
sibly driven out of their jobs, out of the country, and out of the domestic 
pipeline for future U.S.-based innovative discovery.  
The national security threat posed by China is real and the inter-
ception of Chinese intellectual property theft is important, but the Biden 
Administration must develop a more nuanced enforcement approach with 
respect to non-traditional collectors. First, the DOJ should stop using ad-
ministrative reporting statutes as a basis to prosecute academic espionage 
across all fields of U.S.-based academic discourse. Instead, the DOJ 
should increase its understanding of the nature of scientific research in or-
der to more carefully categorize research fields based on actual risk to 
national security. Ethnically Chinese researchers conducting NIH biomed-
ical research or government funded environmental projects may seem like 
tempting political targets, but alienating such individuals in highly open 
and collaborative fields is both futile and self-harming to the U.S. Ulti-
mately, the DOJ should diversify the field of U.S. attorneys responsible 
for bringing charges under the China Initiative. By introducing new per-
spectives, the DOJ improves its chances of prosecuting individuals based 
on bona fide suspicion rather than implicit bias and racial profiling. In the 
meantime, the DOJ should begin by implementing implicit bias training 
as well as measures to prevent and counter racial profiling within the de-
partment. As the United States seeks to protect and expand its innovative 
capacity in years to come, it requires a more nuanced approach to dealing 
with threats and rivals. 
 
 
